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TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN ETHIC IN 
DEBT RESTRUCTURING 
CARMEN AMALIA CORRALES* 
“There comes a time when one set of customs, wherever it may be found, grows to seem 
to you about as provincial as another; and then I suppose it may be said of you that you 
have become a cosmopolite.”1 
— Henry James 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Is there a culture, an ethic, a system, a legal architecture, a club, a tongue 
that characterizes sovereign debt restructuring? Many say there is, starting 
perhaps 150 years ago in the 1850s, with the Ottoman Empire’s accumulation of 
debt and its catastrophic default in 1875, which in turn resulted in the 
imposition of a European “system” to prevent future crises.2 This “system” 
included European invasion of debtor countries—or so called “gunboat 
diplomacy”—which enforced creditor rights by real or threatened military 
force.3 
As time went on, the legal and financial community developed less bellicose 
methods for sovereign debt restructuring, but drama, a high-profile stage and 
actors, polarization, and ethnocentric antagonisms have often remained part of 
the process. Because there is no international legal framework for sovereign 
debt restructuring, modern processes have been governed principally by 
custom, by the terms and provisions of debt instruments (which often provided 
for no collective action to ease the process of restructuring), and by the legal 
demands and constraints of the sovereign and its types of creditors.4 Each 
sovereign debt renegotiation acquires—in the absence of strict statutory rules 
and enforceable precedents regarding fairness, priority, and comity—its own 
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 1. HENRY JAMES, COLLECTED TRAVEL WRITINGS: THE CONTINENT: A LITTLE TOUR IN 
FRANCE/ITALIAN HOURS/OTHER TRAVELS 721 (1993). 
 2. See generally Eldhem Eldem, Ottoman Financial Integration with Europe: Foreign Loans, the 
Ottoman Bank and the Ottoman Public Debt, EUROPEAN REV. 431 (2005). 
 3. See, e.g., Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Investment and 
Controlling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath of the Mexican Financial 
Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 539, 547 (1996) (noting that Great Britain, Germany, and Italy 
blockaded Venezuela and threatened annexation in an attempt to force foreign debt negotiations). 
 4. See Robert Kenneth MacCallum, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Rights and Duties of 
Commercial Banks Inter Sese, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 425, 42728 (1987). 
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form and alchemy.5 To the extent that any one process departs or conforms with 
custom, it becomes, almost without fail, a subject of debate, sometimes stormy 
and heated debate. 
As a “deal lawyer,” I am beholden to process and to the many inchoate 
cultural modalities, assumptions, prejudices, and ever-changing balances of 
power comprised within process. Process—or the series of actions, actors, and 
influences involved in a transaction—is rarely examined in law. But the 
dynamics of process and the unspoken codes that affect it are, nonetheless, key 
to complex transactions and sovereign debt restructuring.6 To the extent that 
process and custom remain unexamined, we miss the opportunity to reconsider 
tacit rules, ethics, and directions, or for that matter, to consider the ones we do 
follow. The purpose of this article is to discuss my experiences and observations 
of the sovereign debt restructuring process since I started practicing in 1990, 
first from a more objective perspective and then from a more personal level. 
Are the oppositional ethics of sovereign debt restructuring inevitable and 
part of the course of nations, or are there ways to create fairer, more 
cosmopolitan processes? If credit defaults and renegotiations are, by their 
nature, contentious, must they also always bear the mark of gunboat 
diplomacy? Those questions exceed the scope of this article, which is meant as 
the beginning of an inquiry and a modest retelling, this time in very broad form, 
of tendencies I have noted during my career. My own biases: I am a deal lawyer, 
as I say above, and I have represented governments in debt renegotiations (so 
that my reflections reflect principally a sovereign perspective in the 
restructuring realm), although I have also represented other parties. Here, for 
the sake of increasing available perspectives, I take a sovereign’s viewpoint, 
although I try to avoid, as I advocate we all should, a solipsistic discourse. 
II 
ELEMENTS OF RECENT PROCESS 
While there are many complicated elements affecting sovereign debt 
restructuring processes, a country confronting debt renegotiations is called to 
balance certain key considerations, principally: (1) consultation and negotiation 
with private creditors, both internationally and domestically; (2) negotiations 
with multilateral, official, and bilateral lenders and associations of lenders; and 
(3) management of its domestic political and economic context, and 
international communication and discourse to the larger world community and 
markets. 
 
 5. Id. 
 6. See generally Nouriel Roubini & Brad Setser, Improving the Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Process: Problems in Restructuring, Proposed Solutions, and a Roadmap for Reform, INSTITUTE FOR 
INT’L ECON. (Mar. 1993). 
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A.  Consultation and Negotiation With Private Creditors 
During the Brady debt restructurings, the prevalent structure for 
negotiation consisted of creditor committees composed of representatives of 
major creditors and observers from the official community.7 Sovereign nations 
negotiated with members of the committee and shared critical information with 
them about their debt repayment capacity, among other matters.8 Upon 
reaching an agreement with the members of the committee, the sovereign 
would obtain an endorsement from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and, in some cases, other multilateral and official sector entities.9 Committee 
members and others would then assist the sovereign in explaining and obtaining 
the consent of other creditors to the terms of the debt restructuring.10 
Committee membership was a coveted and prestigious role. Members were 
men, with few exceptions, who held elevated positions within their own 
institutions and in the financial world. Multilateral and official sector overseers 
of the process were also privileged with special knowledge and expertise. The 
sovereign debt restructuring committee members were often denominated to 
form a “club” and, in many ways, they operated as such.11 Members had access 
to each other and to connections and information. In the international 
sovereign financial community, gripped by the long struggle to resolve debt 
matters, committees and their members took centerstage. 
Brady restructurings resulted in countries issuing Brady bonds in exchange 
for commercial bank debt.12 This began a fundamental change in the nature of 
financing for many countries, which would also, ultimately, result in changes in 
the consultation and negotiation process as the private creditor base turned 
from one consisting principally of commercial banks to a more varied base.13 
Following the Brady era, countries turned to capital market financing in 
varying degrees. Some countries issued bonds occasionally, or of one type or 
principally in one market to institutional investors, while others issued a variety 
of bonds in numerous markets to both institutional and retail investors, and 
everything in between. Even countries that issued solely to institutional 
investors or issued Brady bonds but later relied principally on other forms of 
 
 7. See Philip J. Power, Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications for 
Future Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2701, 271112 (1996) (discussing the role of committees in 
debt restructurings). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See id. at 271213 (discussing the role of the IMF and debtor country governments in debt 
restructurings). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Bailing in the Private Sector: Burden Sharing in International 
Financial Crisis Management, 23 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 57, 70 (1999). 
 12. Ronald J. Silverman & Mark W. Devino, Distressed Sovereign Debt: A Creditor’s Perspective, 
11 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 179, 18283 (2003). 
 13. Id. at 18384; see also Alan Cibils & Rubin Lo Vuolo, Case Studies on Neoliberal Economic 
Reforms: At Debt’s Door: What Can We Learn from Argentina’s Recent Debt Crisis and Restructuring?, 
5 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 755, 758 (2007). 
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financing, might have found that their creditor base later grew to include small 
investors and others, as bonds traded in the market. 
For countries without significant capital-markets debt, the “committee” 
structure, which was prevalent in Brady restructurings, continued to be the 
dominant form of debt renegotiation.14 For countries with significant capital-
markets debt, a “road show” model for investor consultation and for marketing 
a deal became the norm (although some included “consultation groups” that 
conducted similar, but non-binding dialogue with the country). The shift from a 
committee model to a road show model of consultation produced debate and 
dislocation in the sovereign debt restructuring community, which I discuss as 
part of my experiences. 
B.  Negotiations With Creditors 
In both the Brady era and subsequently, negotiations and consultations with 
private creditors were often followed or accompanied by programs with the 
IMF and debt renegotiations with the Paris Club and London Club.15 At the 
same time that countries address private commercial creditors,16 they must also 
consider the demands and expectations of official-sector entities and others who 
form part of the traditional system.17 This can make for difficult balances.  
 
 14. See Lee C. Buchheit, Advisory Committees: What’s in a Name?, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Jan. 1991, at 
9, 9–10 (describing the role, expectations, and criticism of advisory committees in sovereign 
restructurings). 
 15. The Paris Club, which met for the first time in 1956, is an informal group of sovereign creditors 
whose role is to coordinate and restructure bilateral debt owed to member countries. The London Club 
appeared after the Paris Club, as a result of the first cases of sovereign defaults to private banks. The 
London Club provides a negotiating forum in which a defaulting country can reschedule or reduce its 
commercial bank debt. See Mashaalah Rahnama-Moghadam, David A. Dilts & Hedayeh Samavati, 
International Dispute Resolution in Financial Markets: The Clubs of London & Paris, 53 DISP. RESOL.  
J. 71, 71–72 (Nov. 1998) (describing origins of the London and Paris Clubs). 
 16. See, e.g., Policy Dev. and Review and Legal Departments of the Int’l Monetary Fund, Involving 
the Private Sector in the Regulation of Financial Crises—Restructuring International Sovereign Bonds, 25 
(Jan. 11, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/series/03/IPS.pdf (describing 
restructuring processes for Pakistan, Ukraine, and Ecuador, discussing implication of Council of 
Foreign Relations-proposed creditor-sovereign best practices principles on a sovereign’s relations with 
the Paris Club and IMF, and stating that such principles “do not address questions concerning the 
relative treatment of the claims of Paris Club and private creditors” and “request that the [IMF] 
support their application through its lending-into-arrears policy”); see also Jull E. Fisch & Caroline M. 
Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?; The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1043, 1070 (2004) (comparing the recent restructuring of sovereign bonds by Pakistan, Uruguay, 
Ukraine, and Ecuador: “While all of these restructurings involved exchange offers, Pakistan and 
Uruguay relied on ad hoc consultations with bondholders to apprise them of the terms of the offer and 
to encourage them to accept the offer, the Ukraine engaged in an extensive effort to contact 
bondholders, and Ecuador essentially declined to speak with bondholders.”); Javier Díaz-Cassou, Aitor 
Erce-Domínguez & Juan J. Vázquez-Zamora, Recent Episodes of Sovereign Debt Restructurings, A 
Case-Study Approach 64 (Banco de España, Occasional Paper No. 0804, 2008) (“From the outset, the 
[Uruguay] authorities insisted on the market-friendly nature of the debt workout and international 
creditors were actively involved in the design of the restructuring offer through a series of road shows 
and consultations in the major financial centres.”). 
 17. See Lee C. Buchheit, Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 10 BUS. L. INT’L 
205, 208–12 (Sept. 2009) (describing parties with interests in maintaining committee approach to 
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Multilateral creditors have traditionally been considered “preferred lenders” 
even if debt contracts do not establish them as such.18 Because they lend even 
under dire circumstances,19 they expect to be paid and to set conditions for a 
country’s overall economic plans that often include economic austerity 
programs and legal reforms.20 Bilateral creditors who form part of the Paris 
Club may adhere to principles of strict equal treatment, and may push countries 
to delay payments on bonds or renegotiate debt with capital-markets creditors 
if the country enters into arrears or defaults on payments to its members.21 
While a delay on payments on bonds (in order to bring bondholders in line with 
delays Paris Club members have suffered) comports with a theory of equal 
treatment,22 it also may cause a deterioration in bond prices and foreclose access 
to the markets for new money when a sovereign most needs liquidity. 
Multilateral entities may demand a “market-friendly” reprofiling, but they will 
struggle to fulfill policies against so-called “moral hazard,” or the peril that lies 
in lending in a way that appears to “bail out” bondholders.23  The Paris Club and 
the IMF do not always act in concert, and institutions may themselves proffer 
contradictory messages.24 
 
negotiation, including benefits and drawbacks to continuing to use such an approach and the recent 
examples of Iraq’s multitude of competing committees and Belize’s single committee); see also Lee C. 
Buchheit, The Role of the Official Sector in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333 (Summer 
2005) (describing the evolution and variations of official sector involvement in sovereign 
restructurings). 
 18. See Anna Gelpern, Building a Better Seating Chart for Sovereign Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 
1115, 1130 (2004) (discussing the preferential treatment multilateral creditors receive in debt 
restructurings). 
 19. See, e.g., How the IMF Helps to Resolve Balance of Payments Difficulties, INT’L MONETARY 
FUND (Oct. 2008), http://imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/crises.htm (noting that the IMF assists countries 
in restoring stability after crises). 
 20. See Gelpern, supra note 18, at 114849 (noting that senior creditors seek to maximize 
repayment capacity and have greater leverage over government policy); see also INT’L MONETARY 
FUND, supra note 19 (stating that “[b]efore a member country can receive a loan [from the IMF], the 
country’s authorities and the IMF must agree on a program of economic policies”); INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD TO THE INTERIM COMMITTEE OF THE 
BOARD OF GOVERNORS ON OVERDUE FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE FUND 3 (Sept. 9, 1988) 
(discussing the need for all parties to sovereign debt restructurings to “treat the Fund as a preferred 
creditor”). 
 21. See Alon Seveg, When Countries Go Bust: Proposals for Debtor and Creditor Resolution, 3 
ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 25, 40–41 (2003) (reviewing the Paris Club’s “comparability 
treatment assumption,” which stipulates that a debtor seeking to restructure must do so on at least as 
favorable terms as it has with non-Club members). 
 22. See Gelpern, supra note 18, at 1128–29 (stating that in 1999, in the context of Pakistan’s 
restructuring of its debt, the Paris Club required Pakistan to also restructure its Eurobonds). 
 23. See NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? RESPONDING TO 
FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 99–108 (2004) (discussing risks and empirical evidence 
of moral hazard in lending from official entities). 
 24. See Lee C. Buchheit, The Search for Intercreditor Parity, 8 LAW & BUS. REV. AMS. 73, 78–80 
(2002) (outlining the IMF’s dominant role in intercreditor debates and noting the tension that such 
position creates with creditor groups). 
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Domestic creditors often include the country’s banks and other participants 
in its financial system.25 How those creditors negotiate and what types of 
concerns they raise for the country and its stability depend on the particular 
facts and circumstances. Balancing equitable concerns among domestic and 
international creditors is always a challenge.26 The polarization that often results 
between the domestic and international realms usually casts domestic and 
international creditors on opposing sides.27 The reality may be that each part of 
the creditor base may be asked to make concessions and that a country must 
heed different needs and imperatives. If the local financial system is in danger 
of collapse or severe dysfunction, a country faces not merely a debt 
renegotiation with these creditors, but delicate concerns about the impact on 
the country’s people and institutions.28 It must also heed the equitable concerns 
of external creditors and try to maintain a reasonable dialogue with them.  
None of this is helped by the traditional rhetoric of factionalism.29 
C.  Domestic Political Context and International Perception 
There is an inevitable tension between the domestic political pressures and 
needs which a government must heed to preserve confidence and creditor 
demands. The populations of countries in crisis often react adversely to 
prescriptions for further belt-tightening and austerity, which are frequent 
conditions for assistance by the IMF and other official and bilateral sector 
agencies and which private creditors may also want prior to future lending.30  
Aside from political fall-out, countries may find that the fiscal belt-tightening 
demanded by creditors in exchange for debt relief and assistance provokes 
further economic deterioration rather than improvement.31 Domestic political 
confidence and creditor confidence may be so in tension that a country risks 
one for the other, and yet each has enormous impact on the country’s economy 
and health. 
Governments aim to maintain the confidence of their constituents during a 
crisis because this confidence is key to economic improvement and stability and 
to their own self-preservation. At the same time, if they depend on 
international lenders—and most countries do to one extent or another—they 
must also maintain their confidence.32 Different countries strike the balance 
 
 25. See Roubini & Setser, supra note 6, at 28 (noting that domestic debt is often held primarily by 
the domestic banking system). 
 26. Id. at 5–6. 
 27. See Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Debt Crisis: Creditor’s Rights vs. Development: Beyond Balancing 
the Interests of Creditors and Developing States, ASIL Proceedings 222 (2003). 
 28. See Alfred Seymour Hopkins, Duhalde’s Dilemma, WORLD PRESS REV., Mar. 8, 2002. 
 29. See, e.g., George Soros, The Crisis & the Euro, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Aug. 19, 2010. 
 30. See, e.g., John Carr & Joanna Sugden, Three Killed as Greek Austerity Protest Turns Violent, 
THE TIMES OF LONDON, May 5, 2010 (describing Greek protests to national austerity measures). 
 31. Paul Krugman, Self-Defeating Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010. 
 32. Without such confidence, a country’s cost of borrowing on the bond market is driven up to the 
point where it may be forced to seek international aid, as was the case with Greece in 2010. Greece 
Rules Out Any Debt Restructuring, THE MANILA TIMES, Sept. 14, 2010, available at http://www.manila 
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differently.33 Unfortunately, this tension is often posed in black and white terms 
on both sides, when it is usually an extremely complex issue. 
How a country’s debt renegotiation is perceived abroad in a broader 
political context depends on numerous factors, but undoubtedly it is affected by 
political polarities, national interests, and how media and other commentators 
construe and communicate the situation. International sympathies usually run 
more radically in favor of international creditors, who may be severely affected 
and are constituents of countries which may be called to lend and assist the 
country in crisis. International financial media usually deepen the chasm as 
most commentators argue, often in bombastic and untempered terms, that 
countries that have debt problems have mishandled their economies and failed 
to negotiate their debt appropriately.34  
While the criticisms of any country’s handling of its economy and debt in the 
international financial press, such as the Wall Street Journal or The Economist 
(which often bear the distinct influence of neoliberal economic concepts), may 
or may not be tenable, debt problems are often construed in radically different 
ways domestically than internationally. Depending on the situation—and some 
countries do manage to avoid the brink—there may be a radicalization of 
positions and alignments which are not helpful to an eventual resolution. 
III 
MY PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF PROCESS 
“The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human 
advancement.”35 
— John Stuart Mill 
“The world of our experience consists at all times of two parts, an objective and a 
subjective part, of which the former may be incalculably more extensive than the latter, 
and yet the latter can never be omitted or suppressed.”36 
— William James 
 
 
 
times.net/index.php/business-columns/25826-greece-rules-out-any-debt-restructuring (last visited Sept. 
26, 2010). 
 33. Compare Soros, supra note 29 (noting the German government’s reluctance to implement 
publicly unpopular but economically beneficial policies), with Carr & Sugden, supra note 30 (describing 
the Greek government’s adherence to IMF strictures despite violent public riots). 
 34. See, e.g., Ecuador’s Default, THE FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 17, 2008 (referring to Ecuador’s 
policies that led to its 2008 sovereign debt default as “foolishness” and to other defaulting countries in 
the region as “deadbeats”). 
 35. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER WRITINGS 70 (Stefan Collini ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1989) (1851). 
 36. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: A STUDY IN HUMAN 
NATURE 489 (1902). 
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“I sent the club a wire stating, ‘PLEASE ACCEPT MY RESIGNATION.  I DON’T 
WANT TO BELONG TO ANY CLUB THAT WILL HAVE ME AS A 
MEMBER.’”37 
— Groucho Marx 
A.  Learning the Ropes 
I started at Cleary Gottlieb as a summer associate in 1989 after I graduated 
from law school and before I clerked for a judge, like all good students seemed 
to do in those days. I wanted to make a little money before entering the state of 
abject poverty of the judicial law clerk (similar to the financial state of the law 
student from which I had just emerged) and I wanted a taste of Cleary’s famous 
Latin American practice. 
Before I knew it, I was bitten by the sovereign bug. Sovereign work was 
everywhere at Cleary. There was the bankruptcy of Aeromexico, one of the 
principal Mexican airlines,38 the visit of the Chilean government officials—one 
of whom peered at me smiling and asked “did you get good grades at 
Harvard?” And, beyond the work I did, I heard of other lawyers who were 
working on the Mexican Brady debt restructuring.39 Every once in a while, I 
passed by conference rooms crowded with papers and people who looked like 
they had not slept in months. 
By the time I came back to Cleary in 1990, Mexico was finishing its Brady 
debt restructuring, planning its first Yankee bond, and privatizing Telmex, the 
Mexican telephone company. Countries like Uruguay were beginning their own 
Brady processes.40 In those days, I played little roles in lots of those huge deals. 
In retrospect, I realize that this was a key moment in Latin American history as 
many countries moved toward financial integration with the rest of the world 
and, inexorably, toward capital-markets access.41 And the global markets 
themselves were changing. After the crash of 1988 and other seismic market 
events, capital markets were growing again, becoming more accessible, more 
international, and hungrier for emerging-market securities. 
When the Mexican government privatized Telmex, I watched in meetings as 
investor groups from the “developed” world trod cautiously, asked for 
reassurance, and hesitated.42 Yet within a short period of time, Telmex had been 
 
 37. MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 319 (1992). 
 38. See Alan Riding, International Report, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1988 (discussing Aeromexico’s filing 
of bankruptcy in April 1988 “after years of losses”). 
 39. See Ross P. Buckley, The Facilitation of the Brady Plan: Emerging Markets Debt Trading From 
1989 to 1993, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1802, 1804–13 (1998). 
 40. Id. at 1817. 
 41. See Anthony M. Vernava, Latin American Finance: A Financial, Economic and Legal Synopsis 
of Debt Swaps, Privatizations, Foreign Direct Investment Law Revisions and International Securities 
Issues, 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 89, 92–97. 
 42. See generally Marcus Eyth, The Telmex Saga Continues: Foreign Investor’s Expectations and 
Realizations in the Struggle to Compete in the Mexican Telecommunications Market, 14 PACE INT’L L. 
REV. 211 (2002) (providing context for the Telmex privatization). 
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privatized and then gone public to huge acclaim.43 Shortly afterwards, its stock 
price boomed.44 Today, Telmex is one of the most important companies in the 
world.45 From my junior seat in the early 1990s I witnessed the transition from 
the Latin America that no one had believed in or trusted, to the Latin America 
that the markets adored.46 
B.  The Early 1990 Actors 
At the process level, how were things done in the early 1990s and who did 
them? Although there were some women bankers and lawyers, the show was 
run primarily by men. In the Brady restructuring, only some of the Wall Street 
financial and legal participants spoke Spanish or Portuguese. Most did not, and 
few were of Latin American ascendancy. The sovereign debt restructuring 
culture was characterized by aggressive negotiation, larger-than-life 
personalities, and what seemed like intellectual gladiator fights, full of drama 
and intensity. At least this is what I heard. I was too junior to actually witness 
much of those processes. I read the papers. I heard the more tangled tales of 
sovereign debt—the negotiators who paraded trophy girlfriends, the fights, the 
impasses—more than I saw them first-hand. 
I heard about the characters and I knew that they belonged to a club, which 
at the time seemed almost impenetrable to me. The identity and culture of the 
club’s members was of such primacy and importance that, paradoxically, it felt 
as if no one could speak of those things without breaching a taboo. Perhaps it 
was because saying that club members were mainly men, or white, or anything 
in particular was an implicit, intolerable challenge. We were afraid to offend. Or 
perhaps the culture was so centered on individuals that to call attention to 
gender, race, or ethnicity would have been deemed disrespectful. Or perhaps 
there was an implication that the club was private and never to be questioned. 
And so it was that the noble policy that underlay Brady restructurings—to 
end Latin America’s isolation and economic stagnancy resulting from 
unresolved debt default47—was carried out in processes that seemed entrenched 
in dichotomies, in myths, in the personal narcissism of the gladiators, and in a 
certain amount of hostility. The politics seemed enmeshed in the perils of 
history, even if all agreed that Brady restructurings were positive. 
 
 
 43. See id. at 234–38 (discussing positive investor reaction to the Telmex privatization). 
 44. Id. 
 45. See Elisabeth Malkin, Telmex: Mexico’s 800-Pound Gorilla, BUSINESSWEEK, June 18, 2001. 
 46. See Buckley, supra note 39, at 182022; see also Nathaniel Nash, Loading Up on Latin 
American Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1993. 
 47. See generally Silverman & Devino, supra note 12, at 180–83. 
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C.  The Rolling 1990s 
“Democratic theory, whether in its liberal or in its more radical form, is just as stupid in 
analyzing the relation between the national and the international community as in 
seeking a too simple harmony between the individual and the national community.  
Here, too, modern liberal culture exhibits few traces of moral cynicism. The morally 
autonomous modern national state does indeed arise, and it acknowledges no law 
beyond its interests.” 48 
— Reinhold Niebuhr 
In the first half of the 1990s, as countries passed from debt default to issuing 
debt in the capital markets and working with investment bankers, the culture of 
deals also changed. At first, investment bankers who worked with Latin 
America were, for the most part, an assortment of senior male “gringo” bankers 
and junior Latin American bankers. As in all things, there were exceptions—
particularly some notable senior women bankers and people of diverse 
backgrounds. But the stage then was dominated by the phenomenon of the 
“gringo simpatico.” The gringo simpatico sometimes spoke Spanish, which 
delighted most Latin Americans; sometimes, he said he understood Spanish but 
did not really speak more than a few words. “Hola.” “¿Que tal?” “Si.” The 
gringo simpatico played amazingly well in the Latin America of the time 
because he seemed accessible but also a bridge to Wall Street and the venues of 
power in the United States and Europe. Many sovereigns felt privileged to have 
the attention and care of a gringo simpatico. There was an old colonial feel to 
the relationship of the gringo simpatico to people in debtor countries—as if 
even in emerging from colonial models, people retained a sense of the relative 
superiority of Americans and Europeans and felt privileged to have their 
attention. 
At law firms, the gringo simpatico model held full sway. The head of 
sovereign work was almost always a man, a gringo simpatico—or sometimes, 
not so simpatico. I was taught much of what I know by terrific lawyers and 
mentors who probably qualified as a gringo simpaticos. I have no personal 
criticism to levy against any one actor per se, but note the phenomenon as a 
striking and notable aspect of practice back then (and which still continues in 
some markets). As Latin American countries transitioned from debt crisis to 
market access and private investment, however, the gringo simpatico relied 
increasingly on his younger colleagues who often spoke Spanish or Portuguese. 
As the decade wore on, and as Latin American countries opened up further 
to investment, the junior Latin American bankers and lawyers began to grow in 
seniority and stature.49 All over Wall Street, Latin American bankers began to 
 
 48. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF THE LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A 
VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENSE 33 (1947). 
 49. From 1993 to 2002 the number of law firm partners of color rose from 2.55% to 3.71% while 
the number of women partners rose from 12.27% to 16.3%. Presence of Women and Attorneys of Color 
in Large Law Firms Continues to Rise Slowly but Steadily, 2002 NALP Directory of Legal Employers, 
available at http://nalp.org/2002presenceofwomenandattorneysofcolor (last visited Sept. 24, 2010). 
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attain coveted Managing Director titles, and some lawyers of Hispanic 
ascendancy were made partners. I was sitting at lunch one day with a very 
senior acquaintance when he turned to me and said ruefully, with the surprise 
of someone caught off-guard, “My God, when did the Latins take over? They’re 
all over. It didn’t used to be that way.” He was not alone in his befuddlement. 
Others seemed to voice the same discontent, but without naming it outright, 
since that would have seemed incorrect. As for women, the banking world 
lamentably did not seem to admit them in the senior ranks (and some 
prominent women left their banks along the way), although the legal world 
seemed a bit more receptive to women. 
Things had changed for me personally, as well.  I was made a partner at 
Cleary Gottlieb, effective January 1, 1998.50 
In less than a decade, Latin America had coursed through crisis to 
investment, but never left crisis wholly behind. There were significant troubles 
along the way. Mexico experienced severe economic difficulties in 1994 and 
1995, which had caused a “Tequila effect” that affected many other Latin 
American countries.51 The late 1990s brought currency devaluation and crisis in 
Brazil, Russia, and many Asian countries, which in turn provoked capital flight 
from all emerging countries.52 Emerging countries seemed at the mercy of 
capital inflows and sharp outflows at times of alarm.53 A neo-liberal economic 
philosophy seemed pervasive at these times.54 But things change, sometimes 
quickly. 
D.  The Millennium and After 
The turn of the millennium found Latin American countries in diverse 
positions. While some countries had drunk deeply at the trough of capital 
markets, others were merely emerging, and others still were turning away from 
the neo-liberal model.55 Latin American countries had also adopted diverse 
political and economic policies. Debt models and political alignments varied 
across the Latin American territory. Venezuela became an icon of left-leaning 
policies, while countries like Chile retained conservative economic policies. 
 
 50. Carmen Amalia Corrales Biography, available at http://www.cgsh.com/ccorrales/ (last visited 
Sept. 24, 2010). 
 51. See Latin America in the Fallout Zone, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 7, 1995, at 59; Floyd Norris, 
Mexican Shadow Falls on Emerging Markets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1995, at D1, col. 2. 
 52. See Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of the Neoliberal 
Contagion, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1571, 1597–1601 (1999). 
 53. See generally id. 
 54. Id. at 1598. 
 55. See Ines Bustillo and Helvia Velloso, Bond Markets for Latin American Debt in the 1990s, 18 
CEPAL Serie: Temas de Coyntura (2000). 
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Argentina, a country which I had loved since childhood and which I had the 
privilege to work with for many years, began to traverse an unprecedented 
economic and debt crisis shortly as we passed the millennium mark.56 
Argentina declared a moratorium on its external debt at the end of 
December 2001, in the midst of the worst economic crisis in its history.57 Its 
restructuring would put to the test many of the tenets of the old model. I will 
not comment on the substantive aspects of the Argentine debt restructuring, 
but use it only to illustrate certain key process issues and how the Argentine 
restructuring reworked the old polarities. 
I found that the discourse and the perception of Argentina’s default varied 
radically depending, literally, on where one was standing. As many in the 
financial world and the press railed against Argentina, I sometimes took the 
long overnight flight to Buenos Aires and was struck and deeply affected by 
what I saw when I arrived. Buenos Aires, always a beguiling and proud city, 
seemed full of discontent in the years of crisis.58 The poor collected trash at the 
end of the day.59 Children begged on the streets.60 Piqueteros—Argentina’s 
road-blocking protesters—waved banners and shook sticks against their hands 
impatiently.61 Cash machines no longer worked and people could not withdraw 
more than a limited amount from bank accounts.62 The Argentine populace 
demanded economic policies which addressed their needs foremost, above 
matters of debt.63 Standing in Buenos Aires, the world looked very different 
than it did in Washington, D.C. or in New York. If creditors naturally rued their 
losses, the prevailing rhetoric seemed extreme and sometimes unfortunate. 
From a practical and legal perspective, with hundreds of thousands of 
creditors worldwide and more than a hundred series of bonds, Argentina could 
no longer proceed in the old “committee” form.64 It could no longer share 
information selectively with a small group, and could no longer expect a small 
group to be able to help solve everything. The old club would not be 
 
 56. The Argentine crisis has been described as the “worst-case scenario” in eight centuries of 
financial crises throughout the world. See Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, This Time is 
Different: A Panoramic View of Eight Centuries of Financial Crises (2008), available at http://www 
.economics.harvard.edu/files/faculty/51_This_Time_Is_Different.pdf (last visited May 28, 2010). 
 57. See Ross P. Buckley, The Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 43 INT’L 
LAW 1189, 1196 (2009) (describing Argentina’s economic collapse and default on external debt). 
 58. See generally Hopkins, supra note 28. 
 59. Accommodating an Army of Garbage Pickers, CNN.COM (Mar. 26, 2003), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2003/WORLD/americas/03/26/argentina.train.reut/. 
 60. See Sue Branford, Buenos Aires Rallies Against the Bankers, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 13, 2001. 
 61. See Hopkins, supra note 28. 
 62. See id. (withdrawal limits); Train Collision Kills Two, Injures Hundreds; Explosions Detected 
Near Arafat Compound, Transcript of Lou Dobbs Moneyline (Apr. 23, 2002), available at http://edition 
.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0204/23/mlld.00.html (empty ATMs). 
 63. See Hopkins, supra note 28. 
 64. See Cibils & Vuolo, supra note 13, at 758 (discussing the “atomization” of Argentina’s creditors 
from a few commercial banks to hundreds of thousands or millions of bondholders). 
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reconvened; among other things, it was truly ill-suited to the capital-markets 
context. 
This shift provoked huge anger among many in the creditor community, 
including those who supported the committee form of negotiation. While all 
countries face challenges in their communications abroad, the vitriol and 
negative rhetoric in this instance seemed unusually heightened. Part of the rage 
seemed to me a kind of displacement of other concerns. The world was 
changing. The “club” was being challenged and no longer seemed to have a 
clear place, never mind a central place. 
On the heels of the Argentine default and the subsequent restructuring (and 
among reprofilings and restructurings by many countries), the G-20 adopted in 
2004 a code establishing the principal tenets for debt renegotiation: 
1.  Transparency and timely flow of information; 
2. Close debtor-creditor dialogue and cooperation to avoid 
restructuring; 
3.  Good-faith actions, including 
a. Voluntary, good-faith processes when restructuring becomes 
inevitable; 
b.  Sanctity of contracts; 
c.  Vehicles of restructuring, involving the appropriate format and 
role of negotiation; 
d.  Creditor committee policies and practices; 
e.  Constructive debtor and creditor actions during restructuring 
such as, to the extent feasible, partial debt service, maintenance of 
trade credit lines, and constructive dialogue that leads to achieving 
“a critical mass of support” for a restructuring; and 
4.  Fair treatment, or avoiding unfair discrimination among affected 
creditors and fairness of voting of bonds and loans.65 
These principles were self-evidently reasonable. But, very often, the focus of 
creditor ire depends not so much on adherence to a code, but on the severity of 
the haircut that a country finally determines is appropriate. The larger the 
haircut, the greater the ire, no matter how closely a country may adhere to 
reasonable principles. And, even then, other factors, including the moment, the 
mood, and the political and economic orthodoxy of the time, affect how each of 
the foregoing factors may be construed and portrayed. 
In addition, these principles, while good, suffered from certain flaws, both 
inherent and extraneous. They reflected a bias in favor of committees, which do 
not work as well in the capital-markets context as they did in the commercial 
debt context. They were vague while sounding definite. And at the end of the 
 
 65. Principles Consultative Group, Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring 
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day, they were subject to the interpretation of deeply partisan creditors. This is 
not to find fault with the principles per se, but to observe that in an acrimonious 
context, opposing parties will find conflicting interpretations of vague 
principles, reducing the utility of such principles in guiding the process. 
During this time, the IMF proposed a system for sovereign debt 
restructuring (the “SDRM”), which floundered and failed as a result of 
opposition from the market and from many countries.66 The market and 
countries turned instead from SDRM to the incorporation of collective action 
clauses in New York law bonds, which would permit more orderly sovereign 
debt restructurings in the future.67 
In a more successful push to future orderly processes, the U.S. market 
accepted inclusion of standard collective action clauses.68 Bonds governed by 
New York law had previously contained provisions which required the consent 
of each holder in order to restructure debt.69 This left the power to disrupt debt 
restructuring if even a minority of holders held out.70 
In terms of process, many countries have continued adding to the history of 
sovereign debt restructuring.71 Each seems particular, depending on the nature 
of its debt, its creditors, and its political context.72 The old polarities and 
resentments endure, in each case striking a new mark. It is like a game played 
over and over and again, but always differently, with evolving casts and the 
enduring resentments, myths, and folklore, which make it exciting, but also 
more dramatic, fascinating, and sometimes unfortunate. 
It is true that credit renegotiations lend themselves to battle and sovereign 
renegotiation perhaps even more so. Nevertheless, the epic battles do not 
always appear entirely rational or destined to lead to the best resolution. In this 
light, it is perhaps naïve, but important to ask: How do we create a more open, 
cosmopolitan attitude toward debtor nations and a fairer process going forward 
for all participants? 
 
 66. See generally Anne O. Kreuger, Int’l Monetary Fund, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt 
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 72. See id. 
CORRALES 1/16/2011 
Fall 2010] TOWARD A COSMOPOLITAN ETHIC IN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 107 
I hope, perhaps in vain, for a more cosmopolitan ethic in sovereign debt 
transactions—that is, an ethic centered on persuasion and diplomatic exchange 
and in which the complex character of the situation is acknowledged and 
appreciated. The battles may be fairly cast as involving money and legal 
concepts. They should not be cast as fights between good and evil or between 
those who are admitted as part of a club and those who are not. We seemed to 
have started moving beyond the sentimentalized ideal that there is but one way 
to carry out sovereign debt restructuring, and that only certain people know 
how to do it. In truth, there is a diversity of situations, a coexistence of realities 
which cannot be denied, and many tools that can be used in good faith to arrive 
at solutions. 
The emerging world is changing. The developed world also changes. There 
is no longer, arguably, even a primacy of one over the other as countries like 
China and Brazil gain economic force, and countries like the United States and 
others in Europe experience serious economic challenges. With those changes 
and changes in the way business is transacted, there remains a high demand for 
intelligence and cultural affinity. This demand has led to a more diverse group 
of players today and may lead ultimately, although it is far from certain, to a 
cosmopolitan ethic to replace, at least in part, the old “imperial” model. 
